The book is a state of the art reassessment and analysis of the ideological commitments of intellectuals and their relationships with dictatorships during the twentieth century. The contributions focus on turning points or moments of rupture as well as on the continuities. Though its focus is on an East—West comparison in Europe, there are texts also dealing with Latin America, China, and the Middle East, giving the book a global outlook. The first part of the book deals with intellectuals' involvement with communist regimes or parties; the second looks at the persistence of utopianism in the trajectory of intellectuals who had been associated earlier in their lives with either communism or fascism; the third considers the role of intellectuals in national imaginations from the left or the right; and the fourth links late twentieth century phenomena to current phenomena, such as the persistence of anti-Semitism in the West, the slow erosion of the values upon which the EU is built, the quagmire in Iraq, and China's rise in the post-Cold War era.
The collection provides a comprehensive overview of intellectual genealogies and dictatorial developments. Tracing sexual violence in Europe's twentieth century from the Armenian genocide to Auschwitz and Algeria to Bosnia, this pathbreaking volume expands military history to include the realm of sexuality.
Examining both stories of consensual romance and of intimate brutality, it Church and State in 21st Century Britain: The. With Church establishment largely locked in the geopolitics of the late 17th century, this study With Church establishment largely locked in the geopolitics of the late 17th century, this study examines the case for change.
How should the constitution respond to an ever more pluralized society; what are the implications for the religious character of Comparative Politics and Government of the Baltic States:. This book traces the development of the political institutions, electoral systems, parties, civil society, economic This book traces the development of the political institutions, electoral systems, parties, civil society, economic and social policies and foreign affairs of the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania over the last quarter century.
Dialectics for the New Century. This collection brings together leading dialectical theorists from North America, Europe and Asia from a This collection brings together leading dialectical theorists from North America, Europe and Asia from a variety of disciplines. A number of contributors contrast dialectical approaches with opposing methodological frameworks, ranging from scientific reductionism to systems theory and postmodernism.
Others stress Foreign Investment in Southeast Asia in the Twentieth. This monograph is the first book-length study of foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia during This monograph is the first book-length study of foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia during both the late colonial period and in the contemporary period. Larry Summers, of Harvard University, observes that when America was growing fastest, it doubled living standards roughly every 30 years.
China has been doubling living standards roughly every decade for the past 30 years. The Chinese elite argue that their model—tight control by the Communist Party, coupled with a relentless effort to recruit talented people into its upper ranks—is more efficient than democracy and less susceptible to gridlock. The political leadership changes every decade or so, and there is a constant supply of fresh talent as party cadres are promoted based on their ability to hit targets.
Many Chinese are prepared to put up with their system if it delivers growth. Some Chinese intellectuals have become positively boastful. Zhang Weiwei of Fudan University argues that democracy is destroying the West, and particularly America, because it institutionalises gridlock, trivialises decision-making and throws up second-rate presidents like George Bush junior.
The first great setback was in Russia. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in the democratisation of the old Soviet Union seemed inevitable. In the s Russia took a few drunken steps in that direction under Boris Yeltsin. But at the end of he resigned and handed power to Vladimir Putin, a former KGB operative who has since been both prime minister and president twice.
This postmodern tsar has destroyed the substance of democracy in Russia, muzzling the press and imprisoning his opponents, while preserving the show—everyone can vote, so long as Mr Putin wins.
Looking for other ways to read this?
Autocratic leaders in Venezuela, Ukraine, Argentina and elsewhere have followed suit, perpetuating a perverted simulacrum of democracy rather than doing away with it altogether, and thus discrediting it further. The next big setback was the Iraq war. This was more than mere opportunism: Mr Bush sincerely believed that the Middle East would remain a breeding ground for terrorism so long as it was dominated by dictators.
- ISBN 13: 9780333611104!
- Towards New Global Strategies: Public Goods and Human Rights.
- Change Everything: Creating an Economy for the Common Good.
- The Real Facts Of Life: Feminism And The Politics Of Sexuality C1850-1940 (Gender and Society : Feminist Perspectives on the Past and Present)!
But it did the democratic cause great harm. Left-wingers regarded it as proof that democracy was just a figleaf for American imperialism. And disillusioned neoconservatives such as Francis Fukuyama, an American political scientist, saw it as proof that democracy cannot put down roots in stony ground. A third serious setback was Egypt.
Twentieth-century Dictatorships: The Ideological One-party States
But the euphoria soon turned to despair. Mr Morsi treated democracy as a winner-takes-all system, packing the state with Brothers, granting himself almost unlimited powers and creating an upper house with a permanent Islamic majority. Along with war in Syria and anarchy in Libya, this has dashed the hope that the Arab spring would lead to a flowering of democracy across the Middle East.
Meanwhile some recent recruits to the democratic camp have lost their lustre. Since the introduction of democracy in South Africa has been ruled by the same party, the African National Congress, which has become progressively more self-serving. Turkey, which once seemed to combine moderate Islam with prosperity and democracy, is descending into corruption and autocracy. In Bangladesh, Thailand and Cambodia, opposition parties have boycotted recent elections or refused to accept their results. All this has demonstrated that building the institutions needed to sustain democracy is very slow work indeed, and has dispelled the once-popular notion that democracy will blossom rapidly and spontaneously once the seed is planted.
- Ideological Storms.
- Democracy and dictatorship revisited;
- Process Algebras for Petri Nets: The Alphabetization of Distributed Systems.
- The Origin Of Species: 150th Anniversary Edition;
- Communism Timeline - HISTORY;
Western countries almost all extended the right to vote long after the establishment of sophisticated political systems, with powerful civil services and entrenched constitutional rights, in societies that cherished the notions of individual rights and independent judiciaries. Yet in recent years the very institutions that are meant to provide models for new democracies have come to seem outdated and dysfunctional in established ones.
Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Totalitarianism – Part One : Rozenberg Quarterly
The United States has become a byword for gridlock, so obsessed with partisan point-scoring that it has come to the verge of defaulting on its debts twice in the past two years. Its democracy is also corrupted by gerrymandering, the practice of drawing constituency boundaries to entrench the power of incumbents. This encourages extremism, because politicians have to appeal only to the party faithful, and in effect disenfranchises large numbers of voters.
And money talks louder than ever in American politics. Thousands of lobbyists more than 20 for every member of Congress add to the length and complexity of legislation, the better to smuggle in special privileges. All this creates the impression that American democracy is for sale and that the rich have more power than the poor, even as lobbyists and donors insist that political expenditure is an exercise in free speech. Nor is the EU a paragon of democracy.
The decision to introduce the euro in was taken largely by technocrats; only two countries, Denmark and Sweden, held referendums on the matter both said no. Efforts to win popular approval for the Lisbon Treaty, which consolidated power in Brussels, were abandoned when people started voting the wrong way. During the darkest days of the euro crisis the euro-elite forced Italy and Greece to replace democratically elected leaders with technocrats. A project designed to tame the beast of European populism is instead poking it back into life.
EVEN in its heartland, democracy is clearly suffering from serious structural problems, rather than a few isolated ailments. Since the dawn of the modern democratic era in the late 19th century, democracy has expressed itself through nation-states and national parliaments. People elect representatives who pull the levers of national power for a fixed period. But this arrangement is now under assault from both above and below.
From above, globalisation has changed national politics profoundly. National politicians have surrendered ever more power, for example over trade and financial flows, to global markets and supranational bodies, and may thus find that they are unable to keep promises they have made to voters.
International organisations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation and the European Union have extended their influence. There is a compelling logic to much of this: how can a single country deal with problems like climate change or tax evasion? National politicians have also responded to globalisation by limiting their discretion and handing power to unelected technocrats in some areas.
The number of countries with independent central banks, for example, has increased from about 20 in to more than today. From below come equally powerful challenges: from would-be breakaway nations, such as the Catalans and the Scots, from Indian states, from American city mayors.
gohu-takarabune.com/policy/localizar-a/roten-programa-anti-espia.php All are trying to reclaim power from national governments. The internet makes it easier to organise and agitate; in a world where people can participate in reality-TV votes every week, or support a petition with the click of a mouse, the machinery and institutions of parliamentary democracy, where elections happen only every few years, look increasingly anachronistic.
The Ideological One-Party States
Douglas Carswell, a British member of parliament, likens traditional politics to HMV, a chain of British record shops that went bust, in a world where people are used to calling up whatever music they want whenever they want via Spotify, a popular digital music-streaming service. The biggest challenge to democracy, however, comes neither from above nor below but from within—from the voters themselves.
Democratic governments got into the habit of running big structural deficits as a matter of course, borrowing to give voters what they wanted in the short term, while neglecting long-term investment. France and Italy have not balanced their budgets for more than 30 years. The financial crisis starkly exposed the unsustainability of such debt-financed democracy. With the post-crisis stimulus winding down, politicians must now confront the difficult trade-offs they avoided during years of steady growth and easy credit.
But persuading voters to adapt to a new age of austerity will not prove popular at the ballot box. Slow growth and tight budgets will provoke conflict as interest groups compete for limited resources.